Sheree Hewett v. D&S Corporation dba Intermountain Printing/Type Tech : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
Sheree Hewett v. D&S Corporation dba
Intermountain Printing/Type Tech : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Timothy W. Blackburn; Sandra L. Crosland; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy; Attorneys
for Palintiff/Appellee.
Robert A. Echard; Robert A. Echard and Associates; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Sheree Hewett v. D&S Corporation, No. 950347 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6681
UTAH COUHT OF 
BRiEF 
UT\H 














Priority - 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from Second Judicial District Court 
of Weber County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Michael D. Lyon, District Court Judge 
TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN 
SANDRA L. CROSLAND 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
2404 Washington Boulevard, 
Suite 900 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: 801-394-5783 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
ROBERT A. ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2491 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: 801-393-2300 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHEREE HEWETT, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee ; 
vs. ] 
D&S CORPORATION dba ] 
INTERMOUNTAIN PRINTING/ ) 
TYPE TECH, ) 
Defendant/Appellant ) 
i NO. 950347-CA 
1 Priority - 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from Second Judicial District Court 
of Weber County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Michael D. Lyon, District Court Judge 
TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN 
SANDRA L. CROSLAND 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
2404 Washington Boulevard, 
Suite 900 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: 801-394-5783 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
ROBERT A. ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2491 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: 801-393-2300 
LISTING OF ALL PARTIES TO PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the parties to the action in the district 
court below are listed as follows: 
Plaintiff and Appellee: 
Sheree Hewett 
Defendant and Appellant: 
D&S Corporation dba Intermountain 
Printing/Type Tech 
250\104C^ 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS -1-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -ii-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 15 
ARGUMENT 16 
I. The Trial Court's Decision in This 
Case Should Be Upheld Because 
Intermountain Failed to Carry Its 
Burden to Demonstrate That Clear 
Error is the Findings Supporting 
the Decision 16 
Intermountain's failure 
to marshal the evidence 
requires the appellate 
court to assume that the 
trial court's findings 
are correct 17 
B. Intermountain's failure 
to marshal the evidence 
contributed to its 
misrepresentations of 
the trial court's 
decision making process 
The trial court's 
conclusions were based 
upon its assessment of 
witness credibility and 
specific findings of 
fact to which Utah's 
appellate courts accord 





II. Intermountain's Challenge to the 
Trial Court's Conclusion that No 
Construction Eviction Occurred 
Must Fail Because Intermountain 
Did Not Demonstrate Clear Error in 
the Underlying Factual Findings 22 
A. Thomas' testimony 
demonstrated both his 
ignorance of the scope 
of Hewett's 
responsibilities to 
repair and his 
misunderstanding of the 
listed items 25 
B. Intermountain failed to 
demonstrate that the 
clear weight of the 
evidence proved that 
Hewett had received 
adeguate notice of the 
repairs that were her 
responsibility 28 
C. Intermountain failed to 
demonstrate clear error in the 
trial court's finding that 
prospective tenants decided not to 
sublease for reasons outside 
Hewett's control 30 
D. Intermountain cannot 
avoid the deficiencies 
in its appeal by 
claiming that the 




III. Intermountain Failed to 
Demonstrate Clear Error in the 
Trial Court's Findings that Hewett 
did not Materially Breach the 
Covenant to Repair but that 
Intermountain Breached Its Duty to 
Pay Rent 32 
250M0401.1 
- 1 1 -
A, The standard for 
reviewing the trial 
court's findings as to 
breach of contract is 
"clearly erroneous" 32 
B. Intermountain failed to 
demonstrate that the trial court's 
findings as to contract breach 
were clearly erroneous 33 
IV, The Trial Court Correctly 
Concluded That Hewett Had 
Adequately Mitigated the Damages 
Owed by Intermountain When She 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASE LAW 
Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1287 
(Utah 1993) 18 
Anaelo's v. First Interstate Bank of Utah. 
671 P.2d 772,777 (Utah 1983) 35 
Barton v. M.P.B. Enters.f 889 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah App. 
1995) 22 
Bruaoer v. Fonoti. 645 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1982) . . 22, 23, 30 
Copper State Leasing Co. v Blackner Appliance & 
Furn. Co.. 770 P.2d 88, 83 (Utah App. 1988) 21 
Crockett v. Crockett. 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah App. 1992) . . 18 
John Call Eng. Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 
795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah App. 1990) 35 
Kenyon v. Reaan. 826 P.2d 140, 142 (Utah App. 1992) . . . 23, 29 
Larsen v. Knight. 233 P.2d 365 (Utah 1951) 33 
Lemmon v. Coates. 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987) 22 
Mariani Air Prods. Corp. v. Gill's Tire Mkt., 
508 P.2d 808 (Utah 1973) 28 
Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr.. Ltd. v. Smith's 
Food, 889 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1994) 33 
Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb. 591 P.2d 449, 451 
(Utah 1979) 33 
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 8961$UtaB,198) 35, 36 
Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) . . . . 18 
State v. Baoley. 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984) 22 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 937-38 (Utah 1994) 16 
State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) 21, 22 
2S0MO4O1.1 
-iv-
Thirteenth & Washington Sts. Corp. v. Neslen. 254 P.2d 847; 
123 Utah 70 (Utah 1953) 31, 
RULE 
Utah Rule of C i v i l Procedure 5 2 ( a ) 2 , 2 1 / 22 
250M0401.1 
- v -
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court in this 
case is founded on Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j). The 
Supreme Court assigned this case to the Court of Appeals, which 
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
!• Did appellant Intermountain Printing ("Intermountain") 
satisfy its heavy burden of demonstrating that the trial court 
clearly erred in the factual findings supporting its conclusion 
that Intermountain was not constructively evicted from the 
property leased from appellee Sheree Hewett ("Hewett") and, 
therefore, was not justified in withholding rent? 
II. Did Intermountain satisfy its heavy burden of 
demonstrating that the trial court clearly erred in the factual 
findings supporting its conclusion that Intermountain's refusal 
to pay rent was a breach of the Lease which was not excused 
because Hewett substantially fulfilled her Lease obligations to 
repair or justifiably delayed repairing specific problems? 
III. Did Intermountain satisfy its heavy burden of 
demonstrating that the trial court clearly erred in the factual 
findings supporting its conclusion that Hewett acted in a 
commercially reasonable manner to mitigate damages after 




For purposes of assessing the issues on appeal the 
determinations provision is Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), 
which provides: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee Hewett commenced this action against D&S 
Corporation, dba Intermountain Printing/Type Tech 
("Intermountain") seeking damages for nonpayment of rent under a 
five-year lease agreement dated January 21, 1991. A bench trial 
was held on November 14 and 15 of 1993. Following the trial, 
the court entered judgment in favor of Hewett ordering that 
Intermountain pay the rent payments due under the lease. 
Intermountain filed a notice of appeal on March 20, 1995, after 
which the Utah Supreme Court assigned this case to the Court of 
Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Original Lease 
On February 11, 1991, Intermountain's president Dave 
Thomas ("Thomas") entered into a five-year lease with Hewett for 
a commercial building ("the building") located at 3772 
Washington Boulevard for $900 per month. (Trial Transcript 
(hereinafter "T."). at 241; Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). According 
250\10401.1 _ 
to the pertinent portions of the Lease, maintenance for the 
building was apportioned so that Hewett was responsible for the 
roof, exterior walls, structural repair, exterior painting, 
heating and air conditioning equipment, whereas Intermountain 
accepted responsibility for interior walls, interior decorating, 
light globes and tubes, glass breakage, trash removal and 
janitor. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Attached as Exhibit A). 
Prior to leasing the building to Intermountain, Hewett 
had used her building for a hair salon. (T. at 70). The 
removal of the hair salon equipment resulted in holes where the 
sinks had been and plugged off plumbing and wiring systems. (T. 
at 163). When, however, Gary Charlesworth ("Charlesworth"), the 
realtor for Wardley Corporation who showed the property to 
Thomas, pointed out these conditions to Thomas, he responded 
that he had no problem accepting the building because the 
exposed drains and telephone wires would be in Intermountain's 
production room. (T. at 188). 
During most of the time that Intermountain occupied 
the building, the company employed Rusty Hardy ("Hardy") who did 
the maintenance work for Intermountain. (T. at 327-38). Hardy 
reported that routinely he had to clean up dirt that blew under 
the windows, particularly during storms. (T. at 235-38). 
Thomas, however, never reported any problem to Hewett relating 
to dirt coming in under the windows or under the foundation. 
(T. at 283). 
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Thomas did testify that about six times he had seen 
water coming in the building from the sprinkling system that 
Hewett had installed and that he reported the incoming water to 
Hewett. (T. at 277). However, although Thomas stated that he 
himself never cleaned up that water, Hardy never saw such water, 
and Thomas could not explain why his maintenance personnel had 
never seen any water in the building. (T. at 235, 239 & 277). 
In March 1993, Intermountain voluntarily vacated the 
building for business reasons. (T. at 242-43). 
Condition of the Vacated Building 
Immediately after vacating the building, Thomas 
contacted Charlesworth, the same realtor who assisted him in 
leasing the building, and engaged him to sublease the building 
on his behalf. (T. at 243). Charlesworth first went into the 
property about two weeks later. At that time he did not notice 
water marks, but did notice dust, exposed wires and broken 
lights. (T. at 227-28). 
Charlesworth's agent Sharon Hoel ("Hoel") also entered 
the building after March of 1993 to show the premises to 
prospective lessees in July, August, October and November of 
1993. (T. at 165). She described the building as having 
exposed security system and telephone wires, broken light 
fixtures, an extremely dirty bathroom, counter tops stained blue 
and brown, chairs upside down, and cobwebs on the light 
fixtures. (T. at 162-64). She also described trash on the 
250\10401.1 
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exterior of the building and was apparently concerned about the 
activities of "kids" in that area. (T. at 149). 
After Hewett received a key to the building sometime 
in the fall of 1993, she went into the building and was 
horrified by the dirt, broken glass and stained counter tops. 
(T. at 74-75 and 104). She thought the building had been 
vandalized (T. at 75), and did not consider it her 
responsibility to clean up after Intermountain. (T. at 105-106 
and 110). When Hewett's realtor Dana Hale ("Hale") first 
entered the building with Hewett in October or November of 1993, 
it was his immediate impression that "the previous tenant in 
vacating the building had not gone through and cleaned the 
property." (T. at 18). The overall appearance of the building 
was that the floors were dirty, the counter tops were dirty, 
there were broken light fixtures. Id. 
Intermountain's Initial Subleasing Attempts 
On behalf of Intermountain, Hoel showed the building a 
total of about six times, offering the building at a rental 
price of $950.00 to $970.00, which exceeded the $900 per month 
rental in Intermountain's lease with Hewett. (T. at 156). 
During the summer of 1993, Hoel had shown the building one 
prospective sublessee who she described as going through the 
building "inch by inch." (T. at 132). After this woman 
inspected the building a second time, she had Hoel prepare a 
list of questions concerning who would take care of certain 
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repairs and/or modifications in the building that were of 
concern to her. (T. at 132 & 148-49). The list stated: MFYI 
[for your information]: leaks roof and overhang, floor tiles, 
dryer vent, paint, counter tops, cooling system unit full of 
dirt, light fixtures over sink, replace light fixtures, dirt 
inside, handicap bathroom, foundation cracked, floor drain, 
window cracked, overhang rotting." (Defendant's Exhibit 23, 
Attached as Exhibit B) (punctuation added). 
When Hoel was unable to sublease the building to the 
above-mentioned prospective sublessee, she took Charlesworth to 
the building (T. at 192) and showed him the concerns reported in 
the list. (T. at 198). Hoel then faxed the list of the 
prospective tenant's concerns to Thomas on August 31, 1993. (T 
at 245; Defendant's Exhibit 23, Attached as Exhibit B). 
Intermountain's Demand for Repair 
After receiving the fax from Hoel, Thomas sent a note 
to Hewett listing the items from Hoel's fax and demanding that 
Hewett repair all of the items on the note he sent to her. (T. 
at 249-50; Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Attached as Exhibit B). In a 
follow up letter of September 14, 1993, Thomas related 
difficulty leasing the building because of problems including 
"the roof and overhang leak and the front window leak, therefore 
the tiles had started to warp. The building needs to be painted 
inside and out and the cooling system does not work. It is full 
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of sand, the foundation is cracked and a window is broken." 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, attached as Exhibit B). 
Hewett responded to Thomas's correspondence by a 
letters apprising Thomas that she did not intend to do any 
repairs until the rent was brought current and further stating 
"only then will I consider doing the necessary repairs." 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 4). On October 5, 1994 she also asked for 
a key to the building so that she could "see what damage is done 
to my building." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, attached as Exhibit 
B). Thomas then received two letters from Timothy W. Blackburn, 
as legal counsel for Hewett, requesting payment of overdue rent 
plus accrued attorney's fees after which Hewett would repair the 
items for which she was responsible under the Lease. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 7 and 8; Attached as Exhibit B). 
Instead of referring to the lease to determine which 
items listed in his note to Hewett were her responsibility, 
Thomas insisted that he considered Hewett responsible for all 
items listed. (T. at 270-71). 
Alleged Problems with the Building 
One of the pivotal problems with the building 
described to the trial court was a roof leak in the interior of 
the building. Hewett's counsel referred to the leak as a 
"phantom leak," (T. at 325), because water from the alleged leak 
appeared inside the building only on one occasion over the 
course of a year and a half as a water spot about ten inches in 
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diameter, (T. at 170). It was defendant's position, however, 
that the roof had entirely failed and had to be replaced. (T. 
at 318). 
This water leak was not noticed by Charlesworth when 
Intermountain first asked him to sublease the building. Despite 
entering the building several times, Charlesworth did not notice 
any water problems in the building during the five months 
between March and August of 1993. (T. at 192). Charlesworth 
only noticed any water problems in the building after Hoel 
alerted him in August 1993. (T. at 192). When Hoel first saw 
the water on the floor, which she described as about three-
fourths cup of water, she stated that she thought she should mop 
the water up but didn't. (T. at 136). After the water 
disappeared, she never wiped up the mineral deposit apparently 
left in the area and never saw water there again. 
Once Hewett regained access to her building in the 
fall of 1993, she watched carefully for the leak in the roof 
that had been reported to her, particularly after rain. (T. at 
84, 93-94, 112-13). She adamantly testified that the roof did 
not leak because after inspecting on repeated occasions, she saw 
no evidence of a roof leak. (T. at 112-113). She took Dana 
Hale ("Hale"), a real estate agent with twenty-three years of 
experience, through the building with her to look specifically 
for leaks and neither of them found any evidence of leaks. (T. 
at 15-16 & 19). Hale continued to go through the property after 
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rainy weather until the spring of 1994 for the express purpose 
of looking for a water leak after the rain. (T. at 19 & 21 & 
23). 
After six months of looking for a leak, Hewett first 
saw evidence of the alleged leak in March of 1994 when she 
accompanied her attorney Timothy Blackburn through the building 
after he had been shown the leak site by Hoel and Charlesworth. 
(T. at 181, 184 & 211). She testified that if she had been 
aware of an active leak she would offer to fix it because she 
considered a small leak to be minor. (T. at 117). 
The mineral deposit allegedly left by the roof leak 
was never cleaned up despite the fact that Intermountain claimed 
to have had the building thoroughly cleaned several times. The 
spot was eventually photographed in April 1994 by Hewett along 
with certain stains on the counter and the roof where the leak 
allegedly originated. (T. at 91-96). Defendants at no time 
objected that these pictures were not an accurate representation 
of the problems at issue. Id. 
The list faxed to Thomas also asked about water 
leakage causing the exterior overhang of the building to sag and 
about a crack in the exterior foundation. Mr. Echard, counsel 
for Intermountain, requested "that I'd like to have the court go 
out and observe the building," (T. at 285-86). Mr. Echard 
stressed that he wanted the court to see "the significant 
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extensive nature" of the water damage to the exterior overhang. 
(T. at 287). 
Mr. Blackburn to Mr. Echard's request by alerting the 
court to his client's position that crack in the foundation did 
not cause any problem and any leak that had developed in the 
overhang was not material because it did not affect the 
building. (T. at 286-87). Intermountain's witness Charlesworth 
had also testified that a leaking overhang on the exterior of 
the building does not affect the useability of the building. 
(T. at 225). Hewett testified the foundation had Ma few chipped 
cement and that's about it." (T. at 78). 
The trial court personally viewed this situation on 
November 14, 1994. (Affidavit of Judge Michael D. Lyon, 
Attached as Exhibit C). 
The list also noted that certain tiles were buckling 
near the front door. (T. at 198). The parties disputed the 
extent of the damage. Hale testified to observing Ma tile that 
seemed to bulge a little bit and chances are it might have been 
a direct result of the concrete rather than any type of damage." 
(T. at 25). 
Hewett did have a construction worker look at the 
problem with the tile (T. at 76) and she spoke to a roofer (T. 
at 119-120). She cleaned out the cooling system which she 
thought had been vandalized. (T. at 77-78 and 109). She 
considered the broken window to be a tenant responsibility. (T. 
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at 78)• She remarked that glass over certain light fixtures was 
entirely gone which she considered a tenant responsibility. (T. 
at 89). 
When Thomas was asked whether he had been diligent in 
his efforts to mitigate damages which accrued as a result of 
failure to sublease, he answered that his agent had been 
diligent on his behalf. (T. at 266). Thomas had described the 
building as dilapidated (T. at 248), but neither he nor his 
agent, however, testified to doing anything to repair the 
problems on the list related to his Lease responsibilities to 
maintain the building's interior. He testified that he had the 
building cleaned while it was vacant, but Hewett testified that 
any such cleaning efforts left the building dirtier than before. 
(T. at 90). Thomas never had a roofing expert look at the 
building. (T. at 281). 
Adequacy of Notice 
During the trial, Hewett's attorney Timothy Blackburn 
proffered that Hewett would testify that when discussing the 
building's problems, Charlesworth constantly referred her to 
Thomas while Thomas referred her to Charlesworth. (T. at 289). 
Timothy Blackburn also proffered that neither Thomas nor 
Charlesworth ever told her of the leaks under the window through 
which dirt came into the building nor did they tell her that the 




Charlesworth actually had testified he had only one 
conversation with Hewett when she called him in November of 1993 
because she believed rent was owed to her. (T. at 189-90 & 
229). Charlesworth told Hewett then of problems with the 
building but admitted never specifying what things were actually 
wrong with the building. (T. at 229). He told Hewett to speak 
to Dave Thomas about the problems. Id. He testified he never 
told Hewett that if the roof were fixed he would be able to rent 
the building. (T. at 230). 
Hewett testified that she requested that Intermountain 
notify her when the leak reappeared so that she could have the 
situation assessed. (T. at 127). She testified "It's difficult 
to repair a leak if there's no leak." Id. According to 
Charlesworth, when a shingle roof of the type on the building 
leaks, one cannot necessarily tell where the leak originates. 
(T. at 208). 
Intermountain's Inability to Release 
Charlesworth testified that the average time to lease 
a vacated commercial building is six to nine months. (T. at 
232). The interior problems of the building were no problem for 
the right kind of tenant. (T. at 188 and 338). However, after 
more than a year Charlesworth's agency was unable to sublet on 
Intermountain's behalf. 
During that time, Intermountain had asked Charlesworth 
to sublease at $970.00 to $950.00 which amount exceeded its 
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lease rental of $900.00. On one occasion Charlesworth reduced 
the rent to a prospective lessee named Kendall, offering to 
lease the property at $680 per month. (T. at 214). Kendall 
declined to sublease, however, because he decided against moving 
from his present location. (T. at 231). 
Gary Charlesworth stated that several prospective 
tenants did not lease the building because it appeared larger 
than it was and its available space was inadequate for 
prospective sublessee' needs. (T. at 231). 
The particular prospective sublessee who composed the 
above-mentioned list had wanted to know if the landlord would 
agree to putting in a handicapped accessible bathroom to 
accommodate her elderly customers. Hoel, however, found out 
that such modification was not required by the county, and the 
woman declined subleasing the building at least in part for that 
reason. (T. at 164-65). 
Efforts to Mitigate 
When Intermountain returned its key to Hewett and 
refused to pay further rent, she contracted to release the 
property through Hale. He stated that here were two main 
factors which influenced the value of a property for releasing. 
(T. at 27). The first was the user, the second being the time. 
Id. In determining a reasonable value for releasing the 
property, Hale also noted the significance of the lease being in 
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default and the need to satisfy the underlying obligation. (T. 
at 28). 
Hale showed the property to the proprietor of Soup 
Haven, small business entrepreneurs, mortgage companies, a hair 
salon and ultimately ended up renting the property as a floral 
shop. (T. at 22-23). The new tenant James Heine ("Heine") 
acquired the building around the first of September of 1994 in 
order to relocate his floral business. (T. at 53). He had to 
remodel the building to meet his needs by adding partition 
walls, adding a walk-in cooler, putting in new windows, 
carpeting and painting. (T. at 54). Heine did not ask for or 
do structural repairs to the building. (T. at 55). 
In negotiating the rent, James Heine stated that he 
was aware that the building had been empty for a year and a half 
and offered less because he knew that the building had been 
sitting empty for a period of time. (T. at 67). Under such 
circumstances, Hale ascertained that a lease of $600 per month 
was a reasonable value for the particular property at the 
particular time. (T. at 28-29). Heine signed the lease for the 
building on August 31, 1994 after having examined the property 
approximately five times. (T. at 60). In these inspections of 
the property, he had never gone around and looked at the 
foundation to see if there were any cracks or to see if the 
cracks had been patched. (T. at 62). Although it had rained and 
snowed quite a bit during the time that Heine inspected and 
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occupied the building, he never noticed leaks in the roof• (T. 
at 55). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The decision of the trial court should be upheld on 
appeal because Intermountain failed to carry its burden of 
demonstrating that the findings of fact upon which this decision 
was based were clearly erroneous. The conclusions of the trial 
court merit deference on appeal because they are highly fact 
sensitive. Furthermore, Intermountain's failure to marshall the 
evidence forecloses its right to base any appeal on disagreement 
with the trial court's findings of fact. 
The trial court correctly determined that 
Intermountain did not meet its constructive eviction defense to 
nonpayment of rent because Intermountain did not demonstrate 
that the leased building was unsuitable for the purposes 
intended in the lease, the notice given to Hewett to repair was 
inadequate, and her efforts to repair satisfied her duties under 
the Lease. 
Based upon essentially the same facts, the trial court 
correctly concluded that Intermountain breached the lease by 
nonpayment of rent and that its breach was not excused by any 
action or omission on the part of Hewett. The trial court also 
found that Hewett's efforts to release the property satisfied 
her burden to mitigate damages and, therefore, awarded her 
breach of lease damages. Because Intermountain did not satisfy 
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its heavy burden of demonstrating that the trial court's 
decision lacked evidentiary support, its appeal should be 
dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IN THIS CASE SHOULD BE UPHELD 
BECAUSE INTERMOUNTAIN FAILED TO CARRY ITS BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE 
THAT CLEAR ERROR IS THE FINDINGS SUPPORTING THE DECISION. 
In the case before this court on appeal Intermountain 
failed to demonstrate clear error in the trial court's findings 
that Hewett as landlord should be awarded damages from her 
tenant Intermountain because Intermountain unjustifiably 
withheld rent. Intermountain sought to defend the suit for non-
payment of rent under a written lease by claiming constructive 
eviction, breach of contract, and failure to mitigate. On 
appeal Intermountain challenges the trial court's decisions in 
favor of Hewett on all three issues. 
In reviewing the trial court's decision, this court 
should recognize that in order to give the trial judge adequate 
freedom to apply the legal principle to the facts, the Utah 
Supreme Court recently rejected the idea that de novo review of 
certain legal questions is appropriate where the legal question 
is highly fact-dependent. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-38 
(Utah 1994). The amount of discretion or the size of the 
"pasture"1 expands where the facts applied to the legal rule or 
1
 The Supreme Court used the metaphor of a pasture in 
describing the degrees of discretion accorded a trial court's 
application of legal propositions to facts. Pena, 869 P.2d at 
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standard are varying or complex and where the trial judge has 
observed "facts," such as witness demeanor, that cannot be 
adequately reflected in the record. Id. at 938-39. 
In this case, deference rather than de novo review is 
particularly appropriate as the dispute on all three issues is 
highly fact sensitive. In assessing the disputed facts, the 
trial court not only observed the witnesses's demeanor but also 
reviewed photographs of the building's disputed features taken 
by Hewett, to which Intermountain entered no objection. (T. at 
86-95). Furthermore, at the suggestion of Intermountain's 
counsel (T. at 285-288), the court actually traveled to the site 
of the property in question and personally viewed its exterior. 
See Affidavit of Judge Michael Lyon, Attached as Exhibit C. 
Therefore, the record brought up on review cannot recreate the 
image to which the trial court was privy when evaluating 
conflicting testimony and assessing the weight of the evidence. 
A. Intermountain's failure to marshal the 
evidence requires the appellate court to 
assume that the trial court's findings are 
correct• 
Specifically in the context of a challenge to a 
conclusion that no constructive eviction occurred, the Utah 
Supreme Court declared, "To mount a successful challenge to the 
correctness of a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant 
937-38. 
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must first marshal all of the evidence supporting the finding 
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient 
to support the findings even in viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the court below." Reid v. Mutual of Omaha. 116 
P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); see also Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). This requirement of marshaling the 
evidence is consistent with the broad deference owed to a finder 
of fact at trial. State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 
1990). 
An appellant cannot meet its burden on appeal by 
simply by stating facts contrary to the trial court's findings. 
Marshalling requires the appellant first to gather supporting 
evidence and then demonstrate that the trial court's findings on 
a particular point lack adequate support in the record "under 
the clearly erroneous standard." Reid, 776 P.2d at 901. 
"If the appellant fails to so marshal the evidence, 
the appellate court need not consider the challenge to its 
sufficiency." Id. at 738-39. Furthermore, the reviewing court 
will assume that the trial court's findings are correct. Alta 
Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1287 (Utah 1993); 
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah App. 1992) (where 
appellant failed to marshall evidence, appellate court assumed 
record supported findings of the trial court). 
Because Intermountain has not even attempted to carry 
the "heavy burden" of marshaling the evidence supporting the 
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trial court's detailed findings, the merits of Intermountain's 
contentions need not be addressed or considered on appeal, 
Intermountain's has forfeited the right to challenge the trial 
court's legal conclusions on the grounds of disagreement with 
findings of fact because such findings are assumed correct for 
purposes of appeal. 
B. Intermountain's failure to marshal1 the 
evidence contributed to its 
misrepresentation of the trial court's 
decision making process. 
One of the results of an appellant's failure to 
marshall evidence is that the appellant avoids the 
responsibility to assess accurately the evidence contrary to its 
position and thereby reflect on how the trial court might have 
reached its decision. In this case, Intermountain's appeal 
focuses so exclusively on the contrary evidence supporting its 
appeal that Intermountain actually misconstrued the trial 
court's interchange with Hewett's counsel Timothy Blackburn 
during the responsive portion of plaintiff's closing argument. 
Intermountain argued in its brief: "Since the tixai 
court judge did not have a transcript of the comments he had 
made during the trial, the Judge may have forgotten his 
conclusions and concerns which had been stated at the time of 
the trial." Appellant's Brief at 21 (emphasis added) (citing T. 
at 325-28, 332-36). However, a careful review of the pages that 
Intermountain cited in the record demonstrates that the alleged 
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"conclusions" were actually questions and comments made by the 
trial court to alleviate specific concerns prior to arriving at 
meaningful conclusions. 
The court asked challenging questions to force Mr. 
Blackburn to develop his arguments. (T. at 325). The court 
also developed several hypothetical, the first beginning with 
the statement "But let's assume ," (T. at 326-27), a second 
beginning "Let's assume that I agreed with you. . . that the 
premises always remained suitable for the purpose for which this 
they were rented and, therefore, there was no constructive 
eviction." (T. at 332). 
In trying to understand the pivotal question of 
whether Hewett was justified in delaying the repair or 
replacement the roof, the court acknowledged, "I think probably 
in hindsight, based on the evidence, you [counsel for Hewett] 
may be correct" and then probed for the explanation by which she 
prospectively justified her actions. (T. at 328-29). After 
hearing Mr. Blackburn's explanation for Hewett's electing not to 
have a roofer physically examine the roof, the court stated, 
"okay. And if I — if I agreed with that . . . then we get to 
the next step of . . . " (T. at 334). The court described 
testimony adverse to Hewett's position and then asked, "How 
would you answer that?" After listening to Mr. Blackburn's 
explanation, the court stated, "Okay. But let me explore that a 
little further." (T. at 334-35). 
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Mischaracterizing such comments and hypothetical 
questions as "conclusions" and then suggesting that by virtue of 
the delay between the trial and the decision, "the Judge may 
have forgotten his conclusions and concerns which had been 
stated at the time of the trial" ignores the prerogative of the 
trial court to select whatever means it considers most effective 
for clarifying issues of concern. Unless the trial court 
specifically states that it is ruling from the bench, legal 
counsel should not construe, rely on, or assert that the trial 
court's analytical questions and probative comments constitute 
"conclusions." 
C. The trial court's conclusions were based 
upon its assessment of witness credibility 
and specific findings of fact to which 
Utah's appellate courts accord substantial 
deference. 
Intermountain's appeal has failed to demonstrate clear 
error in the findings of fact upon which the trial court based 
its conclusions. On appeal of a judgment from a bench trial, 
the appellate courts in Utah defer to the trial court's factual 
assessment and review its findings under the "clearly erroneous" 
standard. Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blackner Appliance & 
Furn. Co., 770 P.2d 88, 83 (Utah App. 1988); Utah R.Civ.P. 
52(a). Findings of fact are only clearly erroneous if it can be 
shown that they are "against the clear weight of the evidence, 
or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
250YI0401.1 
-21-
conviction that a mistake has been made." Copper State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
It is clear that it is not the function of an 
appellate court to determine the credibility of witnesses. 
State v. Bagleyr 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984); Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 52(a). "Deciding whether a witness is 
believable and determining what weight to assign a witness's 
testimony are matters within the discretion of the finder of 
facts." Lemmon v. Coatesr 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987). 
II. INTERMOUNTAIN'S CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
CONCLUSION THAT NO CONSTRUCTION EVICTION OCCURRED MUST FAIL 
BECAUSE INTERMOUNTAIN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE CLEAR ERROR IN THE 
UNDERLYING FACTUAL FINDINGS. 
The factual findings of the trial court indicate that 
it concluded Hewett did not constructively evict Intermountain 
because Intermountain did not meet the elements of that defense 
to nonpayment of rent. Constructive eviction is defined in Utah 
law as occurring "'when a tenant's right of possession and 
enjoyment of the leased premises is interfered with by the 
landlord. . . as to render the premises, or a part thereof, 
unsuitable for the purposes intended.'" Barton v. M.P.B. 
Enters., 889 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Brugger 
v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1982)). Constructive 
eviction is premised on the idea that the landlord's actions or 
inaction "basically drove the tenant out" by substantially, and 
injuriously interfering with "the tenant's beneficial use and 
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enjoyment of the premises." Id. (discussing Kenyon v. 
Reagan,826 P.2d 140, 142 (Utah App. 1992). 
For purposes of a constructive eviction defense, this 
case is unusual because Intermountain does not claim that any 
action or inaction of Hewett caused the building to become 
unsuitable for its use or enjoyment. Instead, Intermountain 
argues that Hewett's failure to repair the building, after 
Intermountain voluntarily vacated, interfered with its ability 
to sublet to a third party. The trial court, however, found the 
"premises were very habitable." (Findings of Fact I 40). This 
finding merits deference on appeal because whether certain 
premises were suitable for the purposes intended is a factual 
finding. Reid, 776 P.2d at 899) (describing assessment of 
whether claimed annoyances rendered premises unsuitable for 
their intended uses as fact issue). 
After failing to sublease the property after more 
than a year, Thomas abandoned the property and refused to pay 
further rent claiming that its inability to sublet resulted from 
Hewett's failure to repair. The failure to make repairs may 
constitute constructive eviction. Brugger, 645 P.2d at 648. 
However, for purposes of a claim of constructive eviction, the 
repairs demanded by the lessee must relate to that tenant's own 
right of possession and enjoyment of leased premises and the 
failure to repair must be so substantial as "to render the 
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premises or a part thereof, unsuitable for the purposes 
intended.M Id, 
Intermountain's first problem with its defense is that 
it demanded that Hewett repair the property to a degree 
exceeding that for which Intermountain had contracted. 
Intermountain had leased Hewett's former beauty salon for use as 
a printing shop. Mr. Charlesworth, the realtor who showed the 
property to Thomas testified that when he pointed out the 
unsightly features that remained after the beauty salon 
equipment was removed to Thomas, Thomas said that he had no 
problem accepting the property in that condition because during 
Intermountain's tenancy the problem features would be located in 
the production room. (T. at 188). 
In its appeal, however, Intermountain claimed that it 
could not sublease partly because Hewettfs removal of beauty 
salon equipment prior to its occupancy left the building in 
disrepair. Thomas, however, having voluntarily contracted to 
pay Hewett $900.00 per month for the building "as isM had no 
right to demand later that she remodel the premises to be more 
attractive so that Thomas could sublease it at a profit of 
between $50.00 and $70.00 per month. 
Intermountain also complained that the property could 
not be sublet because dirt seeping in under the windows made it 
impossible for Intermountain to keep the property clean. 
Intermountain, however, was fully aware of the dirt seepage 
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problem throughout the entire year that it conducted business in 
the property and never complained. (T. at 235-37). Passive 
acceptance of the dirt seepage problem reasonably allowed the 
trial court to infer that seepage did not materially impact 
Intermountain's ability to carry out responsibility to maintain 
the interior premises. 
A. Thomas' testimony demonstrated both his 
ignorance of the scope of Hewett's 
responsibilities to repair and his 
misunderstanding of the listed items. 
Intermountain's second problem with a constructive 
eviction defense based on breach of the duty to repair is that 
Intermountain demanded repairs desired by a third party without 
regard to whether such repairs exceeded the scope of the duty to 
repair created by the Lease. One prospective lessee had asked 
Intermountain's realtor to compose a list of items in order to 
find out who would be responsible for their maintenance. 
Testimony at trial indicated that Intermountain treated this 
list as the authoritative word on problems with the property 
which Hewett should repair. 
This list was faxed to Thomas on August 31, 1993, and 
then essentially copied by Thomas in a note to Hewett stating, 
Sheree -
/ had some people interested in the building but would 
not because of the following reasons. 
1) Roof leaks and overhang leaks 
2) Floor tiles up front water damage 
3) Dryer vents 
4) Painting 
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5) Cooling system unit full of dirt 
6) Foundation cracked 
7) Windows cracked 
Please see to it that these items are fixed immediately. 
Thanks Dave 
See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). 
During the trial Hewett argued that she was not 
responsible for all of the items on the list, (T. at 108-110) 
and that she never, in any correspondence, promised to do more 
than make repairs that were her responsibility under the Lease, 
The lease delegated to Hewett maintenance responsibilities that 
included the roof, exterior walls, structural repair, exterior 
painting, heating and air conditioning equipment, and electrical 
equipment but delegated to Intermountain all responsibility for 
interior walls and decorating, light globes and tubes, glass 
breakage, and trash removal. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, 
Attached as Exhibit A). 
However, regardless of this division of 
responsibility, when asked which items on the list Thomas 
thought were Hewett's responsibilities, he persisted in arguing 
"I think that she [Hewett] has responsibility for every one of 
them." (T. at 270-75). Thomas' misperception about his own 
lease responsibility was unfortunately was compounded by a 
misunderstanding of the reasons behind the inclusion of specific 
items on the list originally faxed to him. 
Testimony by Thomas attempting to explain the list 
item u Dryer ventsu typifies this problem. Thomas admitted that the 
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Lease did not say that Hewett was responsible for dryer vents. 
(T. at 271). When asked to describe what the dryer vents were, 
Thomas responded, "The dryer vents are where the tenants had — 
the former tenants had I guess their hair — It don't know that 
much about beauty salons, but I guess its where they had their 
dryer vents for getting their hair done." Id. When asked to 
explain Hewett's responsibility for the dryer vents, Thomas 
answered "As far as I know, she was just supposed to cover them 
up." Id. 
By contrast to Thomas' perception, Sharon Hoel, the 
real estate agent who originally wrote the list, explained the 
reference in the notation "Dryervent" as follows: 
A. There was a dryer vent that looked like 
they had done laundry or something. She 
[the prospective lesser] wanted to put one 
there. She wanted to know if there was a 
problem with re-putting one there. 
Q. Just putting it in another in [sic] the 
hole that's already there? 
A. Right. 
(T. at 148). 
Similarly, when Thomas was asked to explain what he 
referred to when he included "Paint" on his list. Thomas stated 
that he referred to painting the outside of the building (T. at 
272), although he admitted that he did not clarify that in the 
list and although the letter he sent Hewett on September 14, 
1994 reported, "The building needs to be painted inside and 
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out," (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, Attached as Exhibit B). Thomas 
then testified that the reason he wanted Hewett to paint the 
outside of the building because "That's what I was told by 
Sharon." (T. at 272). 
Again by contrast, Sharon Hoel testified that she 
referred to interior painting in the list she faxed to Thomas. 
(T. at 148-49). According to the Lease, interior paint would be 
the responsibility of the tenant Intermountain. See Lease 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Attached as Exhibit A). "*A 
constructive eviction cannot be predicated on a condition 
arising from a want of repairs which it is the duty of the 
tenant to make.'" Mariani Air Prods. Corp. v. Gill's Tire Mkt., 
508 P.2d 808, 810 n.3 (Utah 1973) (quoting 49 Am. Jur. 2d 
Landlord and Tenant, § 315, P. 333). 
Thus, the demanded repairs had no relevance to use of 
the property as intended by original Lease. Furthermore, the 
list of items that Thomas wanted Hewett to fix included 
responsibilities delegated to Intermountain and other items 
which Thomas misunderstood entirely. 
B. Intermountain failed to demonstrate that 
the clear weight of the evidence proved that 
Hewett had received adequate notice of the 
repairs that were her responsibility. 
Intermountain's problem during the trial and on appeal 
is that it evidently confused complaining with notice. Findings 
of the trial court indicate that the notice given to Hewett of 
demanded repairs was confused, inadequate, and nonspecific. For 
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constructive eviction to have occurred, however, the landlord 
must have received adequate notice of the defect interfering 
with the lessee's possession and enjoyment of the property and 
then failed to remedy those defects. See Kenyon. 826 P.2d at 
142. 
Lack of effective communication between the parties 
exacerbated their difficulties. When Hewett sought information 
about Intermountain's complaints, Thomas referred her to 
Charlesworth while Charlesworth referred her to Thomas. (T. at 
289). Thomas testified that he wanted Hewett to call him and 
talk to him about the items he had listed in the note he gave to 
Hewett. (T. at 270). However, he admitted that the list he 
gave Hewett never said that he had wanted her to call. 
Charlesworth, Thomas' real estate agent, testified he only had 
one conversation with Hewett and that he told her there were 
problems with the building, but did not specifically tell her 
what was wrong. (T. at 229). 
The trial court found that Hewett reasonably responded 
to the repairs that were hers to make and that she reasonably 
asked to be advised when the roof leaked so that the leak could 
be identified, analyzed and inexpensively repaired. Findings of 
Fact II 26 & 27. The trial court found it unreasonable to ask 
Hewett to replace the entire roof to repair a phantom leak. 
Id. at I 28. These findings are particularly appropriate in 
light of Intermountain's witness's testimony that one cannot 
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necessarily tell where a shingle roof/ like that on the 
building, is leaking because water can enter from one point and 
exit some other place. (T. at 208). Only because the roof 
never leaked again, Intermountain's personnel and realtors never 
gave the requested notice to Hewett. 
Because reasonable notice of an active leak was never 
given, it cannot be said that a reasonable time for repairing 
that problem had actually passed, constructive eviction 
therefore did not occur. See Brugge£# 645 P.2d at 648 
(maintenance problems remedied within reasonable time do not 
constitute constructive eviction). 
C. Intermountain failed to demonstrate 
clear error in the trial court's finding 
that prospective tenants decided not to 
sublease for reasons outside Hewett's 
control• 
The issue of causation in assessing Intermountain's 
failure to sublease the property becomes complicated by the fact 
that subleasing is an independent decision by third parties 
entirely outside the control of either party to the original 
Lease. The trial court found that prospective sublessees 
decided not to sublease for various reasons independent of the 
condition of the property. (Findings of Fact II 16-22). 
Charlesworth testified that the property deceived certain people 
because it appeared larger from the outside than it actually 
was. Ironically, the prospective lessee who originally drafted 
the infamous list actually had stated a separate concern which 
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may have been pivotal to her decision not to sublease: The 
building lacked a handicapped bathroom to service her many 
handicapped clients. 
D. Intermountain cannot avoid the 
deficiencies in its appeal by claiming that 
the cumulative effect of unrepaired problems 
constituted constructive eviction. 
In Thirteenth and Washington Street Corp. v. Neslen, 
254 P.2d 847 (Utah 1953), the Supreme Court of Utah determined 
that the cumulative effect of unresolved adverse conditions 
could become sufficient to establish a constructive eviction. 
However, that court stated: "This case was tried to the court 
and it was peculiarly his prerogative to determine whether the 
difficulties were sufficient to constitute a constructive 
eviction of the tenant. He could consider among other things 
the nature and purpose for which the premises were used." Id. 
at 852. Furthermore, that court stated that in surveying 
evidence to determine whether a trial court was justified in its 
holding as to whether a constructive eviction occurred, an 
appellate court reviews the holding "and every inference fairly 
arising therefrom in the light most favorable to [the party 
that] prevailed below." Id. at 851. 
Thus, it is particularly within the province of the 
trial court to judge the cumulative effect of Intermountain's 
complaints that Hewett failed to repair. In fact, despite 
Intermountain's attempts to analogize its facts to those in 
Thirteenth Street, its facts are readily distinguishable. In 
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the cited case, the court found that a cluttered and confusing 
entry way, unsatisfactory restroom facilities, lack of heat and 
unlighted stairway substantially interfered with the operation 
of an office for attorneys who had to provide adequate access to 
their clients. The trial court in this case, however, found the 
building habitable, thereby indicating that minor leaks and dirt 
seepage and previously accepted unsightly features did not 
substantially interfere with the operation of a printing 
business or a comparable sublease. 
For all of the above reasons, this reviewing court 
should uphold the decision of the trial court determining that 
Intermountain was not constructively evicted and therefore not 
excused from paying the rent required by the Lease. 
III. INTERMOUNTAIN FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE CLEAR ERROR IN THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT HEWETT DID NOT MATERIALLY BREACH THE 
COVENANT TO REPAIR BUT THAT INTERMOUNTAIN BREACHED ITS DUTY TO 
PAY RENT. 
As noted by Intermountain, a lease agreement 
establishes a relationship between a landlord and tenant that is 
so substantially similar to a commercial transaction that legal 
principles of contract law can be appropriately applied to 
leases. Reid, 776 P.2d at 902 n.3. However, Intermountain 
failed to demonstrate clear error in the trial court's 
application of the contract principles to the findings of fact 
brought up on appeal. 
A. The standard for reviewing the trial 
court's findings as to breach of contract is 
"clearly erroneous." 
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The essential question in this case is whether 
Hewett's refusal to complete the repairs requested by 
Intermountain constituted a substantial breach of the lease so 
as to materially impair Intermountain's ability to perform and 
to thereby justify its abandonment of the Lease. "Whether a 
party has materially breached a lease is generally a question of 
fact of the fact finder." Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. 
Smith's Food, 889 P.2d 445, 458 (Utah App. 1994). "The nature 
and inherent importance of the respective covenant breached must 
be the decisive factor in our determination whether 
justification existed or not." Larsen v. Knight, 233 P.2d 365, 
376 (Utah 1951) (Wolfe, J. dissenting). 
B. Intermountain failed to demonstrate that 
the trial court's findings as to contract 
breach were clearly erroneous. 
The trial court essentially found that Hewett did not 
materially breach her Lease with Intermountain.2 A material 
breach is a failure of performance that "xdefeats the very 
object of the contract' or %[is] of such prime importance that 
the contract would not have been made if default in that 
particular had been contemplated.'" Polyglycoat Corp. v. 
Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). Although the court did 
2
 "Where findings as to probative facts are made which 
must necessarily follow the existence of a required ultimate 
fact, the failure to expressly formulate a finding as to the 
ultimate fact is not prejudicial error." Thirteenth Streetf 254 
P.2d at 851. 
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not make a specific finding stating that any breach by Hewett 
was not material, its findings were sufficiently detailed to 
demonstrate such reasoning. Id. at 899. 
The trial court found that the leak that Intermountain 
complained about was not obvious (Finding of Fact f 14), leaking 
was not sufficient to prevent releasing, id. at I 20, the 
building was habitable, id. at I 40, and that Intermountain used 
the water problem as leverage to avoid the lease, id. at I 29. 
The court further found that Hewett reasonably responded to her 
duty to repair and that she was justified in delaying repair of 
the roof because the leak was never shown to her. Id. at I 30. 
On the other hand, the trial court found that 
Intermountain was late in paying rent, its refusal to pay rent 
was unreasonable and nonpayment constituted a breach of the 
Lease. Id. at I 23, 38 & 41. The court found that 
Intermountain was obligated to pay rent and sue for damages. 
Id. at I 39. 
As noted earlier in this brief, Intermountain's 
failure to marshall evidence supporting these findings 
forecloses its right to claim on appeal that the findings are 
erroneous. The facts that support the trial court's contract 
analysis and its conclusion that Hewett should be awarded 
damages for breach of lease are set forth in both the Fact 
Section and the constructive eviction portion of the Argument in 
this brief and therefore are not repeated here. These facts 
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amply demonstrate that Hewett's response to Intermountain's 
demands for repair did not constitute a material breach of the 
Lease. Intermountain's failure to perform under the lease 
therefore was not excused. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT HEWETT HAD 
ADEQUATELY MITIGATED THE DAMAGES OWED BY INTERMOUNTAIN WHEN SHE 
SUBLET THE PROPERTY. 
The trial court found that Hewett mitigated her 
damages. Finding of Fact I 37. "'The doctrine of avoidable 
consequences, also referred to as mitigation of damages, 
generally operates to prevent one against whom a wrong has been 
committed from recovering any item of damage arising from the 
wrongful conduct which could have been avoided or minimized by 
reasonable means.'" John Call Eng. Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 
795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Angelo's v. First 
Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983)). 
In modern commercial landlord-tenant transactions, "a 
landlord who seeks to hold a breaching tenant liable for unpaid 
rents has an obligation to take commercially reasonable steps to 
mitigate its losses, which ordinarily means that the landlord 
must seek to relet the premises." Reid, 776 P.2d at 906. 
Although a landlord must take positive steps to relet premises, 
his or her efforts to mitigate are judged by a standard of 
objective commercial reasonableness. Id. "[T]he objective 
commercial reasonableness of mitigation efforts is a fact 
question that depends heavily on the particularities of the 
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property and the relevant market at the pertinent point in time. 
Id. at 907. 
The trial court in this case found that there were 
specific circumstances that impacted Hewett's mitigation 
efforts. The property had stood vacant and the tenant who 
eventually released it used extended vacancy in negotiating for 
lower rent. Findings of Fact I 34. The court also found that 
Hewett became desperate to lease the property because she had 
not received rent payments for ten months while she continued 
paying mortgage payments. Id. at I 35. These particularities 
of the property have relevance to Hewett's duty to mitigate. 
As Intermountain pointed out in its brief, the Reid 
court stated that it was not uncommon for a landlord to incur 
expenses to remodel commercial property for a new tenant. 
Appellant's Brief at 33. However, in the Reid decision, 
remodeling was not discussed as part of the duty to 
affirmatively act to mitigate damage, but rather in stating that 
the cost of remodeling to accommodate a new tenant should Mbe 
added to the amount recoverable from the breaching tenant.M 
Reid, 776 P.2d at 907. Thus, Intermountain's complaint that 
Hewett discounted the rent in her release during the remainder 
of Intermountain's lease is without merit. Whether by discount 
to the new lessee or by damage assessment against the breaching 
lessee, the landlord has a right to recover remodeling costs. 
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Specifically Intermountain complained that Hewett's 
failure to repair the leaking roof demonstrated that she failed 
to mitigate. Intermountain's brief compared the evidence of the 
leak to tracks of an animal which it would defy logic to state 
had mysteriously disappeared. Appellant's Brief at 34. The 
trial court, however, found that it was reasonable for Hewett to 
delay repair until Intermountain alerted her to a reappearance 
of the leak in the interior of the building. The fact that 
Intermountain was never able to demonstrate that the leak 
reappeared may defy logic, but it does not prove that Hewett did 
not mitigate her damages. This court should therefore affirm 
the damages awarded Hewett by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
This appellate court should affirm the decision of the 
trial court because Intermountain has failed to satisfy its 
burden of demonstrating that the conclusions of the trial court 
were founded on clearly erroneous factual findings. 
Intermountain claimed that the trial court erred in finding that 
it had not been constructively evicted, that Intermountain, not 
Hewett breached the Lease, and that Hewett adequately mitigated 
her damages. Intermountain failed to marshall the evidence 
supporting the trial court's decision on these issues, and in 
fact was unable to demonstrate that these conclusions were based 
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upon findings of fact that lacked evidentiary support in the 
record. 
DATED this day of August, 1995. 
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Suite 900 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5783 
250M0401 1 
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748 Maple Street 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
September 14, 1993 
Dear Sheree, 
I am having trouble leasing the building because of some problems with it that 
need your immediate attention. 
The roof and overhang leak and the front windows leak, therefore the tiles have 
started to warp. The building needs to be painted inside and out and the cooling 
system does not work. It is full of sand, the foundation is cracked and a window is 
broken. 
I have had many people inquire about the building but all have said that it is in too 
bad of shape. 
I will not continue to pay rent if these items are not fixed. Call me if you have any 
questions. 
Thank you, 
Dave C. Thomas 
President 
Iatermouotaia Priattng / TvpeTecB 
Document Svstemt Corporation 
Corporate Offices: 825 25th Street Ogden. Utih 84401 
Phone 801-394-4162 Fax 801-393-0640 
South Ogden: 3772 Washington Boulevard Ogden. Utah 84405 
Phone 801-399-0067 Fax 801-399-0068 
GUM rtJta* 
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n * v EXHIBIT MO. _ 2 L _ 
MIRAMAR-INC. TSSSaJlkftk 
MAPLE GARDENS RESTAURANT" ~am 
4030 Riverdale Rd. 
Ogden, Utah 84405 / 
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MAPLE GARDENS RESTAURANT 
Ogden, Utah 84405 OcZTc>&P'<£ 5 m 3 
801-621-1004 ^ 
f7tz.o/ *•?' *//? &,*e* £3 p?je „^4b_ <ff^9yc. 
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MIRAMAR-INC. 
MAPLE GARDENS RESTAURANT 
Ogden. Utah 84405 
801-621-1004 
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L A W O F F I C E S O F 
V A N C O T T , B A G L E Y , C O R N W A L L & M C C A R T H Y 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
SUITE 1 6 0 0 
SO SOUTH MAIN STREET 
S A L T L A K E C ITY , U T A H S«*H*~* 
TELEPHONE (SOI) 5 3 2 - 3 3 3 3 
TELEX 4S3L*9 
W BLACKBURN OGOEN OFFICE 
SUITE 9 0 0 
2*0<* WASHINGTON BOULEVARD 
OGOEN. UTAH e * * O t 
(801) 3 9 4 - 5 7 8 3 
November 5, 1993 
Mr. Dave C. Thomas 
Document Sys tems C o r p o r a t i o n 
825 2 5 t h S t r e e t 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Dear Mr. Thomas: 
I represent Sheree Hewett. D&S Corp- doing business as 
intermountain Printing/Type Tech, is in default of the lease 
dated June 28, 1991, whereby it leased the property at 3772 
Washington Boulevard. 
D&S Corp. has failed to make the September, October and November 
payments. The amount due for rent is $2, 700. 00. 
Because you are in default, you owe my client' s attorney fees 
which are $120. 00. 
The lease provides that you pay one-half of the snow removal. My 
client has paid the total fee and is willing to waive your one-
half if you pay the delinquency within ten (10) days. 
I have reviewed your letters sent to my client. Section 57-22-5 
Utah Code Annot. does not allow you to withhold rent if the items 
you requested are not resolved. 
My client will immediately repair the items for which she has 
responsibility under the lease upon your payment of the rent. 
The lease spells out specifically each parties responsibility to 
maintain an item. 
Any damage that is due to tenant1 s neglect is the responsibility 
of the tenant to repair. 
Request is made that you allow my client access to the premises 
so that she may inspect the premises to determine what repairs 
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 4. «tthin the time s 
.
 not "°»** rSere^Vomey tees. 
£ the tent xs not ^ f or ^ 0 0 6 t s . 
L intends to »
 f e e 6 ana °ou 
•emoval fees, ^ t e Sincerely. 
! f / f l ^heree Hevett 
907\49S3. 
L A W O F F I C E S O F 
V A N C O T T , B A C L E Y , C O R N W A L L £. M C C A R T H Y 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L CORPORATION 
S U I T E I 6 0 0 
S O S O U T H M A I N S T R C C T 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y , U T A H e * l * * 
T E L E P H O N E ( S O U 5 3 2 - 3 3 3 3 
T C L C X * B 3 l * 9 
TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN — — 
O G D E N O F F I C E 
SUITE 9 0 0 
2 4 0 4 W A S H I N G T O N B O U L E V A R D 
O G O E N , U T A H e«*~*Ol 
( S O I ) 3 9 4 - 5 7 8 3 
November 30, 1993 
Mr. Dave C. Thomas 
Document Systems Corporation 
825 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Dear Mr. Thomas: 
I represent Sheree Hewett. D & S Corporation, doing business as 
Intermountain Printing/Type Tech, is in default of the lease 
dated June 28, 1991, whereby it leased the property at 3772 
Washington Boulevard. D & S Corporation has failed to make the 
November payment. The amount due is $900. 00. The lease provides 
for attorney' s fees and attorney fees now have accrued to 
$180. 00. 
You failed to pay one half of the snow removal payments when you 
paid the September and October rent. My client is still willing 
to waive one half the snow removal if you pay the delinquent 
November rent plus my client1 s attorney fees within ten days from 
the date of this letter. 
My client will immediately repair the items for which she has 
responsibility under the lease upon your payment of the rent. 
The lease spells out specifically each party' s responsibility to 
maintain an item. Any damage that is due to your neglect is your 
responsibility to repair. 
Sincerely# 
Timothy W. Blackburn 
TWB/dh 
cc: Sheree Hewett 
PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT MO. 0 
CASE NO 
turn ffl<MM 
P L E A S E R E P L Y T O 
O G O E N O F F I C E 
907X1752. 
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SUITE 1600 
SO SOUTH MAIN STREET 
MAR 1 j 
I 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH B+\++ _ , L ^ . . ~ . 1 . . - ^ 
TELEPHONE (SOD 532-3333 
TELEX *S3I*© 
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(BOD 394-S783 
March 28, 1994 
Mr. Robert A. Echard 
^ f S a s h t n g t o n Boulevard Sui te 200 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Dear Bob: . . 
™ . r t v with Dave Thomas. Mr. charlesworth, h i s 
U i T S S S a ^ n r i ^ n o ^ e r real e s t a t e agent. 
The only t M - ^ t i - J S - , 3 2 til 3 . - S S £ i ? S S S S the 
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: n | r s X % r M « t h ^ \ n r ^ e r e was no e v i n c e t h a t t h e r o o , 
was l e a k i n g I f ^ " / ^ " g ^ t h e property. I f the roof l e a k s , 
prevent Mr. Thomas from l e a s i n g t 
my c l i e n t w i l l repair i t . 
in my opinion, the b i g g e s t ^ g ^ Z ^ ? & * ' e l v e r s are 
renting i s the bui ld ing i s extremely oa Y ^ ^
 l s broken and 
broken? eabinets are damaged, glass^ in
 i e d t h i s b u i l d i n g 
t Z % £ trgoodarc\eea^ngeawoulNd° ,°o a long way t o he lp him l e a s e 
the bui ld ing . . . 
, . *. «HII accent $500.00 a month 
To s e t t l e t h i s matter, ^ i n f ^ s t p a y ^ n f February 1996. My 
beginning January 1994, ? ^ * h * ^ " * 0 £ r t y and your c l i e n t would 
c l i en t w i l l take P ° s s e s s l ° n ° f *** PMy c l i e n t i s free t o use the 
not have any further P M M " x ° £ i e n t y w i l l waive the snow removal 
property as she d e s i r e s . «y 
costs and her attorney f ees . ^ ^ 
Also accepted t o my cl ient^ i s t h a t m ^ ^ \ ^ \ Z continue 
rent beginning January 1994 pay •¥
 i n f a c t # t h e roof 
Possess ion of the buildxng and paying re 
•M\49«3. 
V A N C O T T , B A G L E Y , C O R N W A L L & M C C A R T H Y 
Mr. Dave C. Thomas 
March 28, 1994 
Page 2 
leaks, my client will fix it. As soon as any leak appears, notify 
my client and she will have someone fix it. It is difficult to 
repair a leak when there is no leak. 
In my opinion, the leaks are certainly not material and the court 
will not terminate the lease based upon old evidence of two small 
leaks. 
In addition, your client did not bring the payments current because 
he did not pay the attorney fees demanded. 
These offers to settle expires March 31, 1994, at 5:00 p.m. 
Sincerely, 
Timothy V. Blackburn 
TWB/dh 
cc: Sheree Hewett 
907X4983. 
LAW OFFICES 
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
K E Y B A N K BUILDING, S U I T E 2 0 0 
2491 W A S H I N G T O N B O U L E V A R D 
O G D E N , UTAH 84401 
PHONE: (801) 393-2300 
„ u . - n FAX: (801) 393-2340 OF COUNSEL: 
K ECHARD C R A | G D STOREY 
GEILMANN 
March 22, 1994 
Mr. Timothy Blackburn 
Suite 900 
2404 Washington Blvd 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Re: Documents Systems Corporation Lease 
3773 Washington Blvd, Ogden, Utah 84403 
Dear Tim: 
As you probably know I represent Dave Thomas. He has 
contacted me recently concerning a lease he has with your client, 
Sheree Hewett. My client leased property from yours in 1991. In 
approximately September, 1993 my client complained to yours about 
the fact that the building was in a poor state of repair, and 
need to be brought to a good condition of repair so that he could 
re-lease the property. When your client did not respond, he 
withheld the rent payments. 
In a letter from you dated November 5, 1993 you stated 
•.. "my client will immediately repair the items for which she has 
responsibility under the lease upon your payment of the rent. 
The lease spells out specifically each parties responsibility to 
maintain an item." 
My client brought the payments current, however, your client 
failed to repair the property, as required by the lease and as 
agreed to in your November 5, 1993 letter. 
I am hereby notifying you that my client considers that 
failure a breach of the lease terms, and consequently no longer 
feels bound by the terms of the lease. He has not been paying 
lease payments since January, 1994 and will not pay any future 
!aase payments on this property. 
qi-oZO 
page Two 
March 22, 1994 
I am sure the Court will have not difficulty in 
understanding that the property is not of any value t, 
as long as the lessor refuses to honor the lease teriu 
provide a building that is capable of being re-lease, 
client. My client has attempted to re-lease the prop 
reduce the amount of the lease payments. However, nc 
been willing to consider the property because the coi. 
in. 
Sincerely, 
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
Robert A. Echard 
Attorney at Law 
RAE/LER 









*-tion it is 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHEREE HEWETT, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. 




1 AFFIDAVIT OF THE HONORABLE 
1 MICHAEL D. LYON, DISTRICT 
I COURT JUDGE 
i No. 950347-CA 
1
 Priority - 15 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
MICHAEL D. LYON, having been duly sworn, deposes and 
states: 
1. I presently serve as a district judge for the 
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, State of Utah. 
2. In my capacity as district judge, I presided over 
the civil trial of Case No. 940900191 on November 14 and 15, 
1994, wherein Sheree Hewett as plaintiff sued D&S Corp. , dba 
Intermountain Printing/Type Tech seeking damages for unpaid rent 
for the lease of a commercial building located at 3772 
Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah. 
3. Throughout the trial of this matter, plaintiff 
Sheree Hewett was represented by Timothy W. Blackburn and 




4. On November 14, Mr, Echard, after examining 
defendant' s witnesses and prior to resting defendant' s case, 
requested that the court personally observe the.building at 3772 
A 
Washington Boulevard. 
5. After I adjourned court on November 14, 1994, I 
proceeded to 3772 Washington Boulevard and personally viewed the 
ert&rior fy+fa 
building at issue. 
A
 ii 
DATED this 1[ day of August, 1995. 
MICHAEL D. LYON \ 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 
August, 1995, 
nik day of 
'Wr^u 
NOTARY S i g n a t u r e and S e a l 
DEAN C. OLSfc: 
NOTARY PU8UC*STAnotU' 
847 EAST 2800 NORTH 
NORTH OGDEN, UT 84414 
COMM. EXP. 2-24-97 
250X10381. 1 
08/10/95 -2-
